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The possibility to enhance the detection efficiency of the Concealed Information Test (CIT)
by increasing executive load was investigated, using an interference design. After learn-
ing and executing a mock crime scenario, subjects underwent three deception detection
tests: an RT-based CIT, an RT-based CIT plus a concurrent memory task (CITMem), and
an RT-based CIT plus a concurrent set-shifting task (CITShift). The concealed information
effect, consisting in increased RT and lower response accuracy for probe items compared
to irrelevant items, was evidenced across all three conditions.The group analyses indicated
a larger difference between RTs to probe and irrelevant items in the dual-task conditions,
but this difference was not translated in a significantly increased detection efficiency at
an individual level. Signal detection parameters based on the comparison with a simu-
lated innocent group showed accurate discrimination for all conditions. Overall response
accuracy on the CITMem was highest and the difference between response accuracy to
probes and irrelevants was smallest in this condition. Accuracy on the concurrent tasks
(Mem and Shift) was high, and responses on these tasks were significantly influenced by
CIT stimulus type (probes vs. irrelevants). The findings are interpreted in relation to the
cognitive load/dual-task interference literature, generating important insights for research
on the involvement of executive functions in deceptive behavior.
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INTRODUCTION
There is a growing body of behavioral, psychophysiological, and
neuroimaging evidence revealing that lying is a complex, cogni-
tively demanding behavior. Most of this evidence reflects an overall
increase in executive control demands imposed by lying, as com-
pared to truth-telling. Truth-telling is considered a baseline,almost
automatic cognitive state (Spence, 2004). To support this claim,
lying has been proven to take longer than truth-telling (Spence
et al., 2001), necessitating greater cognitive effort (see Vrij et al.,
2011, for a recent review). Furthermore, it activates a wider net-
work of prefrontal neural areas linked to executive functioning
(see Christ et al., 2009; Gamer, 2011, for reviews). However, recent
research questions the “cognitive complexity” view of deception
(Gombos, 2006), revealing that in certain contexts lying might
not be that cognitively demanding, especially as a result of exten-
sive practice (e.g., Hu et al., 2012a,b; Van Bockstaele et al., 2012).
This raises the need for developing deception detection tools less
vulnerable to the effects of practice. One interesting possibility
is to increase the cognitive workload experienced during decep-
tive behavior (Vrij et al., 2006). Inducing an overall increase in
cognitive/executive load, such as by asking participants to narrate
their deceptive stories backwards has been shown to interfere with
lying, facilitating the process of lie detection by enhancing ver-
bal and non-verbal cues to deception (Vrij et al., 2008). However,
the backwards recall technique has been questioned with regard
to the accuracy and completeness of the retrieved information
(Dando et al., 2011), suggesting that a global interference with
deceptive and memory processes might induce some unwanted
collateral effects. An ingenious recent study (Debey et al., 2012)
actively manipulated executive control,using an ego depletion pro-
cedure prior to detecting deception and inducing goal neglect
during the deception task (by using longer response-stimulus
intervals). Across two experiments, goal neglect, but not the ego
depletion procedure facilitated deception detection efficiency, gen-
erating longer deceptive response speed (but not consistently lower
accuracy).
Vrij et al. (2006) suggested that requiring interviewees to per-
form a concurrent secondary task while being interviewed might
provide a useful tool to enhance lie detection. There have been
some preliminary experimental attempts to add a parallel task
aimed at disrupting the executive functions involved in the decep-
tive act, yielding mixed evidence in terms of effects on deception.
In a Concealed Information Test (CIT, see the description below),
Ambach et al. (2008) added a parallel inhibition (Go/No-Go) task.
This manipulation was supposed to interfere with the very sub-
processes of response inhibition that are required for deceptive
responses. However, the physiological and behavioral measures
of deception (RTs, error rates) were not significantly affected by
introducing this additional measure (see Ambach et al., 2008 for a
discussion of these negative findings). In a recent investigation,
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Ambach et al. (2011) pursued this line of reasoning, but they
introduced a working memory (WM) task in parallel with the
deception test. This manipulation affected RTs to critical items
to a larger extent when compared to irrelevants. Considering
the limitations induced by the very long RTs specific to the psy-
chophysiological measurement design, the authors suggested that
a faster pace of the task (asking the subjects to respond within a
second) would enhance this preliminary documented effect. This
idea was recently tested by introducing an interfering inhibition
(dot-probe) task within each trial of the Reaction Time-based (RT-
based) CIT, which led to an increase in its detection efficiency (Hu
et al., 2013). The present study aimed at further testing this pre-
diction, using the RT-based CIT at a faster pace, and interfering
with two different executive functions shown to be involved in the
deceptive act (WM updating and shifting). Moreover, rather than
introducing a parallel task, peripheral to the deception detection
task, in the present study the concurrent task targeted the same
items used in the deception detection test, presumably creating a
larger interference with deceptive behavior.
The abovementioned “high cognitive workload” studies have
used a variety of deception detection paradigms, ranging from
naturalistic interviewing settings to elaborated experimental con-
texts. The use of a unique and well-supported research paradigm
which has also been used in ecological settings would substantially
benefit the integration of various investigations targeting cogni-
tive control in the deceptive act. This research context could be
provided by the CIT, which is one of the most widely adopted
techniques by nowadays deception research (Verschuere et al.,
2011; Ben-Shakhar, 2012). Originally known as the Guilty Knowl-
edge Test (Lykken, 1959, 1974), this procedure is an interrogation
technique designed to test individuals for knowledge that only a
guilty person could posses. The subject is presented with several
multi-choice questions. For each question, there are several equally
plausible alternatives, only one being correct. Hence, the test is
based on the rationale that the critical alternative is recognized
only by the guilty suspects. A different version of this test based on
measuring reaction times was proposed by Seymour et al. (2000),
now known as the RT-based CIT (Seymour and Kerlin, 2008; Ver-
schuere et al., 2010). In this procedure, the subject is required to
give speeded responses to three types of items: probes, targets, and
irrelevants. Probe items are selected from the crime itself and are
supposed to represent relevant details of the crime; the irrelevant
items share a variable degree of categorical similarity with the rel-
evant items, and are usually several times more numerous. The
deceptive subject denies recognition of both irrelevant and probe
items. Target items (explicitly learned and recognized as such) are
used in order to prevent the subject from entering an automatic
mode of responding; they also share categorical similarity with the
other two types of items. A number of studies have suggested that
this procedure can successfully differentiate between truthful and
deceptive responses, or between guilty and innocent participants
on the basis of RTs, supporting the validity of the RT-based CIT
(see Verschuere and De Houwer, 2011 for a recent review).
The main aim of the present study was to systematically inves-
tigate whether introducing a concurrent executive load targeting
the very CIT items, rather than a parallel interfering task, would
better differentiate between truthful and deceptive responses in
the RT-based CIT. The current investigation used an interference
design, introducing tasks involving two executive functions evi-
denced to be relevant for the deceptive act: memory updating and
flexible set-shifting (Morgan et al., 2009; Visu-Petra et al., 2012). In
order to efficiently plan and execute a deceptive act, a person needs
to continuously monitor and update memory contents in order to
distinguish truthful from deceptive responses, and to flexibly alter-
nate between these mental sets in producing the deceptive response
(Walczyk et al., 2003). A third executive functioning dimension
(according to the model proposed by Miyake et al., 2000), namely
inhibition, has been documented to be involved in deception (Ver-
schuere et al., 2007; Hu et al., 2013), but it was not directly targeted
by the current study.
Consistent with previous findings by Ambach et al. (2011), we
hypothesized an increase in CIT detection accuracy due to the
introduction of the concurrent memory load condition. We antic-
ipated that the introduction of the requirement to hold on to
a memory load while performing recognition judgments would
interfere with WM updating processes, and disrupt their effi-
ciency by slowing them down (Logan, 1979). The manipulation
was supposed to affect deceptive responses to a greater degree
than truthful responses, because they required a larger amount of
executive resources compared to simple visual recognition skills
necessary for responses to irrelevants and targets, and the exec-
utive resources are depleted by the concurrent task. This would
be evidenced by an increase in difference scores (RTs) between
probes and irrelevants in the CIT plus memory condition. A sec-
ond research interest was to investigate whether this effect could
be replicated when introducing a concurrent task which required
flexible set-shifting. We explored whether performance slowing
would be further increased in this context, because flexibly shift-
ing between responses in a trial-to-trial manner could place greater
executive demands than a simple memory load. In addition to
the main measure derived from the CIT (the RT), we wanted to
explore whether response accuracy would discriminate between
truthful and deceptive responses in the three experimental con-
ditions. Finally, we wanted to see whether performance on the
concurrent tasks itself would be more impaired on the trials con-
taining probes than on the trials with irrelevants, thus reflecting the
reciprocal interference generated by deception-related increased
executive demands.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Participants (N = 75, 62 females) were recruited from general psy-
chology classes by using an online recruitment system and received
credit for their participation. All participants underwent the mock
crime procedure described below, followed by the three CIT con-
ditions. Data from the CIT plus memory test of one participant
were lost due to a technical failure, and data from one participant
were discarded altogether from the analysis because he remem-
bered less than four of the five probes used in this experiment.
A remaining total of 73 participants (62 females) were included
in the data analyses. The age of participants ranged from 19 to
43 years, and the mean age was 22.76 years (SD= 4.79). Partici-
pants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and wore glasses
or contact lenses if necessary.
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MATERIALS
Concealed information test items were two-word phrases: five
probes, five targets, and 20 irrelevants (four corresponding to each
probe), which were generated for this study and very similar to
items used in previous studies (e.g., Farwell and Donchin, 1991;
Seymour et al., 2000; see Appendix). They were displayed using
the E-Prime software on a 17′′monitor. Each word pair subtended
0.85˚of vertical visual angle, and ranged from 2′′ to 4.2′′ of hori-
zontal visual angle depending on word pair length, from a viewing
distance of approximately 60 cm.
TASKS
All participants completed a series of tasks as follows: they read the
instructions for the mock crime, they executed the mock crime,
then completed a filler task; afterward, they studied and learned
the target items and finally resolved the three CIT conditions (the
order of presentation was counterbalanced across subjects).
Mock crime
The participants were initially required to read and sign the
informed consent form. Afterward, the mock crime scenario was
presented. Written instructions were used at this time, according
to which they had to pretend to be a student of Psychology who
was about to take a previously failed exam at an important course
in the following day. Because of some personal issues, he/she had
been unable to study. However, in the previous day, the student
had presumably visited the professor’s office for a meeting. There
he/she noticed a paper on the desk and saw the login Id (Psiho
MCC, where the MCC abbreviation stands for – in Romanian –
Cognitive Behavioral Modifications, the actual name of the course)
and password (patru verde/four green) for the discipline’s e-mail
account which is hosted on the faculty’s official web site. With
this information, he/she was instructed to access the course e-mail
account from a café (Café Amber) placed in certain street (Bicaz
Street ; all locations were chosen from another city in order to
avoid previous exposure). After accessing the account (which was
created to be identical to a real course application on the actual
faculty website), the participant had to search the Inbox for the
e-mail with the exam subjects that the professor had sent to the
course tutor (Amalia Ciuca; the name of the actual tutor was used,
with her and the professor’s consent) for multiplying exam papers.
The participant had to forward this message with the attachment
to their personal e-mail account.
Subjects read these written instructions twice and memorized
(emphasized) the five critical items (i.e., the probes). Afterward,
they were asked to go into a distant room of the same building
(designated as Café Amber) and perform the actions from the sce-
nario (access the e-mail account with the username and password,
forward the e-mail). The interface was a mock program designed
for this study and was deactivated after the completion of the study.
Following the mock crime, a non-verbal reasoning test taken
from a standardized battery was used as a filler task, lasting for
about 12–15 min. This data was not analyzed further.
In the target learning phase, the participants learned a sequence
of five items similar to the probes. They were instructed to memo-
rize the items in order to reproduce and recognize them. In order
to obtain a good memory for the target items the participant was
asked to complete two pencil-and-paper cued recall tests after the
memorizing phase: in the first run, they were presented with the
first word of the two-word phrase, and in the second run they were
presented with the second word. In each run the participant com-
pleted the missing item. This was followed by a free recall test. If
wrong answers were given at any time, they were again presented
with the items and asked to memorize them. A final verbal recall
was performed to ensure a good retention of each item.
RT-based CIT
After the mock crime and the target learning phase, the par-
ticipants undertook the three CIT procedures designed for this
study: a classical RT-based CIT, a CIT with a concurrent mem-
ory task (CITMem), and a CIT with a concurrent set-shifting task
(CITShift).
The items utilized in this study were two-word phrases belong-
ing to three categories of items: probes (the five critical items from
the mock crime), targets (five to-be-recognized items, also from
the same category as the probes), and irrelevants (items from the
same category as the probes, not previously encountered). For
each probe, four similar irrelevants were selected. The items were
matched on number of syllables across the three categories (see
Appendix). In each of the three conditions, each item was repeated
four times, generating a total of 120 trials/condition. The partici-
pants were instructed to press Yes when presented with the targets,
indicating recognition, and No to any other item encountered. The
two response keys were counterbalanced across subjects. Item pre-
sentation was randomly established by the E-Prime software for
the CIT and CITShift conditions. For the CITMem, a randomized
list was generated and kept constant across subjects, to allow for
verbal recall accuracy to be checked by the experimenter with a
response key.
In the CITShift, the primary task remained the same, but the
stimuli themselves appeared written in bold or in italics. Subjects
had to press the answers to the CIT once if the item was written
with bold and twice if the item was written with italics. Stimuli
were presented equally often in bold or italics. The assignment of
number of presses to the respective fonts was also counterbalanced
across subjects.
In the CITMem condition, the task was spaced in sequences
consisting in groups of three items, with items randomly divided
over sequences. The subject again had to press Yes or No to each
item according to CIT instructions, but additionally he/she had to
memorize the last word of each two-word item. After each three
items sequence, a blank screen appeared. The subject had to ver-
bally reproduce the three words he/she had memorized. After this,
the participant pressed the space bar in order to initiate the next
three items sequence. The experimenter verified the accuracy of
verbal answers with an answer-key. A total of 40 memory checks
were performed.
Each condition began with a training phase identical in length
(16 trials). For each condition, written instructions were presented
and verbally clarified by the experimenter. The instructions for
the CIT were identical for all the three tasks. For the CITMem
and CITShift, general CIT instructions were followed by specific
instructions referring to the additional task. A shortened version
of the instructions also appeared on the computer screen before
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the practice trials. The items used in the training phase were
similar to the subsequent CIT items (three probes, three targets,
10 irrelevants).
The inter-stimulus interval randomly varied between 500, 800,
and 1100 ms in order to discourage automatic responses or prepa-
ration effects (cf. Seymour et al., 2000). If a response was not made
within 1200 ms, a “Too slow” message appeared. The 1200 ms
interval was established after a pilot study in which shorter stim-
ulus presentation RTs were associated with floor levels of per-
formance on the CITMem and CITShift. No feedback was given
(except for the practice trials, where the participant received feed-
back after every response). Each item remained on the screen until
a response was made.
Scoring
For each condition, accuracy and RT (for accurate responses) on
the CIT according to stimulus type represented the main collected
measures. On the CITMem, an additional index of memory for
each stimulus type across trials, and also for mixed groups of three
was added. For each group of three items, we checked whether they
recalled the last word for irrelevants, probes, or target items, and
whether the group of three items was also correctly recalled. For
the CITShift, accuracy in pressing once/twice the answer accord-
ing to stimulus font was calculated; however, an inaccurate shift
was not considered to be an error on the CIT (e.g., if the subject
pressed once the answer No when presented with a probe it was
scored as a shifting error, if the task was to press twice, but it was
not scored as a CIT error). However, in the analysis of RTs, only
time until first press was recorded and analyzed (for correct CIT
responses).
RESULTS
RESPONSE TIME
Group effects
In order to analyze the RT data, an elimination of outliers was
first conducted. Since there was an established upper limit for RTs
of 1200 ms, we only eliminated responses faster than 200 ms as
outliers. Descriptive data for accuracy and response time accord-
ing to stimulus type are presented in Figure 1. In the subsequent
analyses only the comparison between probes and irrelevants is
considered, similar to other studies using the RT-based CIT (Sey-
mour et al., 2000; Seymour and Kerlin, 2008; Verschuere et al.,
2010; Visu-Petra et al., 2012).
A two-way repeated-measures ANOVA with Condition (CIT vs.
CITMem, and CITShift) and Stimulus type (probe vs. irrelevant)
as within-subject factors was conducted for the mean RT data.
The results showed that there was a significant effect of Condition,
F(2, 144)= 341.91, p< 0.001, MSE= 9600.04, partial η2= 0.83.
Post hoc pairwise comparisons (with a Bonferroni correction)
indicated that subjects were significantly faster on the traditional
CIT than on both the CITMem, and the CITShift, p< 0.001. They
were also significantly faster on the CITMem than on the CITShift.
There was a significant main effect of Stimulus type, F(1,
72)= 288.63, p< 0.001, MSE= 1958.06, partial η2= 0.80. Across
conditions, subjects were faster in responding to irrelevants than
to probes, p< 0.001 (see Figure 1).
Finally, there was a significant Condition× Stimulus type
interaction, F(2, 144)= 12.5, p< 0.001, MSE= 678.88, partial
η2= 0.15. There was a significant increase across tasks in RTs to
both irrelevants, and probes, respectively, with the fastest responses
on the CIT, followed by responses on the CITMem, and by longest
responses on the CITShift,p< 0.001 in each case. To investigate the
magnitude of the difference between RTs for irrelevants and probes
across conditions, difference scores (difference between mean RTs
for probes minus mean RTs for irrelevants) were calculated for each
condition. Post hoc paired t -tests revealed that RT differences were
smaller in the CIT than in the CITMem, t (72)= 2.12, p= 0.04,
and in the CITShift, t (72)= 5.23, p< 0.001. Additionally, differ-
ence scores were significantly larger in the CITShift compared to
the CITMem, t (72)= 2.80, p< 0.007.
Detection efficiency
Measurement of response latency differences across experimen-
tal conditions can lead “to an increased likelihood of finding
FIGURE 1 | Mean response time (left ) and accuracy (right ), according to stimulus type (Probe, Irrelevant, orTarget) and condition (CIT, CITMem,
CITShift). Error bars indicate standard error of the mean (±2 SEM).
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spurious overadditive interactions” (Faust et al., 1999, p. 777),
which could determine an artificial inflation of effect size. The
authors recommended z-score transformations to augment tradi-
tional analyses of raw response latencies. Also, Bush et al. (1993)
recommended the use of the z-score to remove the influence of
individual differences in overall mean response latency within a
single group. To eliminate individual differences in responsivity,
within-question standardized scores were computed by subtract-
ing the mean of all five responses (one probe and four irrelevants)
from the response to the probe and dividing that by the standard
deviation of all five values (Ben Shakhar, 1985; Meijer et al., 2007).
These standardized scores were then averaged over questions in
order to produce a single detection score for the CIT, CITMem,
and CITShift (Meijer et al., 2007).
According to signal detection theory, the efficiency of detection
may be assessed by considering the degree of separation between
the distributions of the detection measure for the innocent and the
guilty conditions. Although we included only guilty participants in
our study, the distribution of the detection score for innocent indi-
viduals can be estimated (Carmel et al., 2003; see also Meijer et al.,
2007). Our signal detection parameters were based on a compari-
son with a simulated innocent group consisting of 73 participants.
Following the procedure proposed by Carmel et al. (2003), we gen-
erated an innocent group by drawing five values randomly from
a standard normal distribution. One value (as the “probe”) was
standardized relative to the mean and standard deviation of all
five values. The computation was repeated five times and the new
values were averaged to obtain a score for one innocent participant
(Meijer et al., 2007).
We also analyzed the possibility of increasing detection effi-
ciency by combining measures of concealed information. Using
the method described by Nahari and Ben-Shakhar (2011) and by
Hu and Rosenfeld (2012), we averaged the z scores from CIT and
the z scores from CIT Shift into a new combined measure.
After we computed the distance (in standard deviation units)
between the centers of the two distributions (d ′), we derived the
area under the receiver operating characteristic – ROC (Ben Shakhar
and Elaad, 2003). The area under the ROC curve (AUC) represents
the degree of separation between the distributions of the response
time from guilty and innocent participants. It varies between 0
and 1 (perfect detection level), with a chance level of 0.5 (Hu
and Rosenfeld, 2012). The d ′ and the AUC for each condition are
displayed in Table 1.
Intraindividual bootstrap analysis
To allow for a more in-depth testing of probe versus irrelevant
differences within an individual, data from each condition were
bootstrapped (Wasserman and Bockenholt, 1989) and hit rates
were subsequently calculated. After excluding incorrect behav-
ioral responses and artifacts, a computer program draws, with
replacement, a set of individual probe reaction times equal to the
number of accepted probe trials in each block and also draws
(with replacement) an equal number of irrelevant reaction times,
selected randomly from the irrelevant trials. Next, a difference
score is obtained by subtracting the mean irrelevant reaction times
from the mean probe reaction times. This process is repeated 500
times (Verschuere et al., 2009), resulting in a distribution of 500
Table 1 | Means, Standard deviations, standardized differences (d ′)
and area under the curve (AUC) for CIT, CITMem, CITShift, and the
combination of CIT and CITShift for the Guilty and Innocent
Conditions.
Measure Mean z
guilty
Standard
deviation
guilty
Mean z
innocent
Standard
deviation
innocent
d ′ AUC
CIT 0.48 0.37 −0.04 0.31 1.54 0.86
CITMem 0.53 0.43 −0.03 0.38 1.39 0.83
CITShift 0.59 0.26 −0.02 0.43 1.71 0.88
CIT and
CITShift
0.53 0.32 −0.08 0.37 1.75 0.89
Table 1 reveals that d′ values for the CIT, CITMem, and CITShift were 1.54, 1.39,
and 1.71, respectively. The d′ value for the combination of CIT and CITShift was
1.75. The areas under the ROC curve (AUC) were 0.86 for the CIT, 0.83 for the
CITMem, 0.88 for the CITShift, and 0.89 for the combination between CIT and
CITShift (all other combinations had equal or lower AUCs compared to individual
measures).
differences scores. If the mean difference score minus 1.29 times
the standard deviation is greater than zero, it can be concluded
with 90% confidence that the probe reaction times are slower than
the irrelevant ones.
Bootstrapping of the CIT reaction times resulted in a hit rate
of 67%, i.e., for 49 out of 73 participants concealed information
was detectable through their slower responses on probe stimuli.
For the CITMem, a hit rate of 64% was computed, while for CIT-
Shift, 68% of the participants displayed a reaction time for probes
that sufficiently deviated from that for irrelevant stimuli to be of
diagnostic value.
RESPONSE ACCURACY
CIT accuracy
Additional analyses regarding performance accuracy according to
stimulus type were conducted, in order to ensure the compara-
bility of the current procedure with previous data reported by
studies using similar methodology (e.g., Seymour et al., 2000).
First, mean percent correct for responses to irrelevants and for
deceptive responses to probes were calculated (see Figure 1). In
order to directly compare percentages for the two stimulus types,
an arcsine transformation was then applied to this percent correct
data (Cohen, 1988, cf. Gamer et al., 2007).
First, a two-way repeated-measures ANOVA with Condition
(CIT vs. CITMem vs. CITShift) and Stimulus type (probe vs. irrel-
evant) as within-subject factors was conducted. The results showed
that there was a significant effect of Condition, F(2, 144)= 31.30,
p< 0.001, MSE= 0.03, partial η2= 0.30. Post hoc pairwise com-
parisons (with a Bonferroni correction) indicated that subjects
were significantly less accurate on both the CIT and the CITShift
than on the CITMem (although accuracy on the CIT and on the
CITShift did not differ).
There was also a significant main effect of Stimulus type,
F(1, 72)= 80.86, p< 0.001, MSE= 0.01, partial η2= 0.53. Across
conditions, accuracy in responses to irrelevants was higher than
accuracy in responses to probes, p< 0.001 (see Figure 1).
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Finally, there was a significant Condition× Stimulus type
interaction, F(2, 144)= 23.59, p< 0.001, MSE= 0.01, partial
η2= 0.25. Accuracy in response to irrelevants differed across tasks,
F(2, 144)= 10.65, p< 0.001, MSE= 0.01, partial η2= 0.13, with
responses on the CITMem being more accurate than on both
CIT and CITShift, p< 0.05. Accuracy in response to probes also
significantly differed across tasks, F(2, 144)= 33.67, p< 0.001,
MSE= 0.03, partial η2= 0.32. Again, post hoc contrasts revealed
that accuracy to probes on the CIT and CITShift was signifi-
cantly lower than accuracy to probes on the CITMem, p< 0.05. To
investigate the magnitude of the difference between accuracy for
irrelevants and probes across conditions, difference scores (accu-
racy for irrelevant minus accuracy for probes) were calculated for
each condition. Post hoc paired t -tests revealed that the differ-
ence between irrelevants and probes was larger on the CITShift,
compared to both CIT, t (72)= 2.37, p< 0.02, and to CITMem,
t (72)= 6.58,p< 0.001, respectively. This difference was also larger
in the CIT, compared to the CITMem, t (72)= 4.93, p< 0.001.
Accuracy on the concurrent tasks
A final step was to check for accuracy on the secondary tasks (Mem
and Shift). Results showed that accuracy for recalling groups of
three on the CITMem was high, mean percent correct= 93.37,
SD= 5.62. Comparing memory for probes versus irrelevants (after
the arcsine transformation of percent correct data), we found that
subjects were significantly more accurate in recalling the last word
of the probes, than of the irrelevants, t (72)= 7.85, p< 0.001.
Overall accuracy in shifting between responses to stimuli writ-
ten in bold or italics was also high, mean percent correct= 87.24,
SD= 11.06. This time, accuracy in shifting responses to probes
was lower than accuracy in shifting responses to irrelevants (after
the arcsine transformation of percent correct data), t (72)= 6.88,
p< 0.001.
DISCUSSION
The present study analyzed how introducing an additional execu-
tive load impacts the accuracy and efficiency of deceptive responses
in the RT-based CIT. We hypothesized that the introduction
of a concurrent memory load or of flexible shifting demands
along with the primary recognition task would selectively inter-
fere with the executive processes required by deception. Therefore,
we expected increased detection accuracy of the RT-based CIT
in the two conditions with concurrent executive demands, com-
pared to the traditional CIT. We anticipated that the introduction
of more complex shifting demands would affect performance to a
larger degree than the memory demands. Finally, we also checked
whether performance on the concurrent task was itself affected by
CIT stimulus type (probe vs. irrelevant).
The results partially confirmed these predictions, but revealed
interesting distinctions between group and individual detection
efficiency, and between performance accuracy and response time.
First, it should be pointed out that the concealed knowledge effect
was confirmed across tasks, with subjects presenting longer RTs
and lower accuracy on the probes, compared to the irrelevants.
This supports the potential of the two RT-based CIT versions (with
additional memory load or set-shifting demands) to distinguish
between truthful and deceptive responses.
Looking at group differences between conditions in terms of
RT, we found that subjects were faster on the CIT than on the
versions containing additional memory updating or set-shifting
demands. This difference was probably a consequence of the extra
time required to deal with the increased cognitive load, which
affected preparatory, processing, or execution stages of responses
in the dual-task conditions (Pashler, 1994). The result confirms
previous findings that have used an interfering WM task in the
CIT, which increased RTs to both irrelevants and probes (Ambach
et al., 2011). Similar to Ambach’s study, the increase in RTs to
probes was larger than the increase in RTs to irrelevants, with the
outcome of an increased RT-based detection efficiency in the two
conditions that contained interfering tasks, compared to the tradi-
tional CIT condition – at least at this group level. Since the design
did not allow us to directly contrast the influence of the additional
cognitive load on guilty versus innocent participants’ behavior, a
next step was to simulate a hypothetical group of innocent subjects.
The comparison between distributions of the guilty group and
the simulated innocent group showed that the CIT d ′ value was
slightly below the average effect size (d ′= 1.55) computed in the
meta-analysis made by Ben Shakhar and Elaad (2003) for the
psychophysiological CIT. The ability of all the measures to dif-
ferentiate between guilty and innocent participants was evident
from the d ′ values. The values of 1.39, 1.54, 1.71, 1.75 for the
concealed information measures in this study represent a large
effect size (Cohen, 1988). Also, the computed AUC showed accu-
rate discrimination for all conditions, with the highest rate for the
combined measure (CIT+CITShift). Among the two interfering
tasks, the demand to flexibly shift responses on a trial-to-trial basis
created the largest discrepancy between responses to probes and to
irrelevants, and was also associated with the highest hit rate (68%)
among the three conditions, although the differences among them
were not significant.
In terms of performance accuracy, subjects had fewer errors
in a CITMem, compared to the traditional CIT and to the CIT-
Shift conditions. Importantly, this effect was visible for all stimulus
types, and did not differentiate between them. Increasing demands
for attentional control induced by concurrent tasks have not been
found to affect simple recognition accuracy (Baddeley et al., 1984;
Craik et al., 1996), unless there is a deep encoding of the to-be-
recognized items (Hicks and Marsh, 2000). It is plausible that the
additional conceptual processing required by the memory task
might have led to a deeper encoding and to a better subsequent
recognition of the stimuli in the CIT task. Since we could not
prioritize one task over another, it could be conjectured that the
subjects strategically used a sequential strategy. In this context, not
only would the two tasks not disrupt each other, but performance
on one task could even be enhanced by a deeper earlier processing
of the stimuli within the other. When input stimuli are similar,
it is possible for dual-task performance to be enhanced because
the “same set of processing machinery could be turned on and
used for both” and because overt responses we not incompatible
between tasks (Pashler, 1994, p. 221). For instance, when focusing
on encoding the last word of the probes, subjects could become
more aware of the type of stimulus (probe or irrelevant) for the
CIT response. Or conversely, if they first focused on responding
to the CIT, recognition of the item as a probe could result in an
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enhanced memory for the previously encountered stimulus. This
was indeed demonstrated by better overall accuracy in probe recall.
The prolonged/more intensive processing of the stimuli in this
condition was translated into an increase in response time com-
pared to the CIT, leading to a potential speed-accuracy tradeoff
that is often found in dual-task contexts (Schumacher et al., 2001).
Why was a similar effect not visible in the CITShift condition?
In this case, overall accuracy wasn’t significantly different from
the traditional CIT, and further, the crucial difference between
truthful and deceptive responses was even enhanced – just as
we initially expected for both dual-task conditions. Two types
of explanations might account for the different findings result-
ing in enhanced detection efficiency with this task. Firstly, both
lower accuracy on the Shift task and the increased processing time
suggest that the concurrent task was more difficult and executive-
demanding than the memory load task. This confirms the superior
executive demands induced by switching between task sets, when
compared to simple memory storage (Oberauer et al., 2003). The
conclusion is also supported by the greater reciprocal interfer-
ence between competing tasks when probes were presented. The
result of the interference led to a decrease in performance in
both the CIT response (longer RT, lower accuracy compared to
irrelevants) and the shifting task (lower accuracy for probes). Sec-
ondly, the shifting task targeted the perceptual (font type), and
not the conceptual dimension of the CIT stimuli. This could have
generated a greater incompatibility between the two tasks, affect-
ing the more executive-demanding deception trials more. The
literature (Pashler and Christian, 1994) suggests yet another possi-
bility: the two simultaneous overt manual responses elicited by the
CITShift interfered to a greater degree than the manual plus vocal –
non-simultaneous – response present in the CITMem. Finally, an
interesting possibility is that the superior accuracy found in the
CITMem could simply be a result of the task providing the partic-
ipants with regular (self-paced) breaks in order to recall the items.
This could help them maintain better focus and diminish the goal
neglect induced by the (fast-paced) superimposing of two tasks
(such as in the CITShift).
Accuracy on the concurrent tasks was high in both conditions,
but much higher in the Mem task (93%) compared to both the
Shift task (87%) and to the previous investigation of Ambach et al.
(2011) using an n-back task (83%). It has been shown that if the
memory load is significantly below the subjects’ memory span
(in this case, three elements), people’s ability to retain the mem-
ory load is usually unaffected by the concurrent task, except for a
relative slowing of overall task performance (Pashler, 1994) also
noticeable in the present study. Interestingly, probes were better
recalled than irrelevant items. This could be a result of previ-
ous exposure to the probe stimuli during the mock crime. The
preferential recall of probes could also indicate memory enhance-
ment for stimuli with emotional/motivational significance, com-
pared to neutral stimuli (Kensinger and Corkin, 2003). The Shift
task revealed an opposite trend, namely poorer shifting accu-
racy in response to trials containing probes. We have already
proposed some explanations suggesting the higher interference
between the CIT and Shift tasks in the more executive-demanding
tasks containing probes. The results obtained with the concurrent
task underline the importance of equating for interfering task
difficulty; this could be achieved by a control condition containing
only the concurrent tasks, but not targeting items from the CIT.
To summarize, by contrasting general detection efficiency
between the three conditions, we found the following. Accord-
ing to the group analyses, both dual-task conditions were superior
in discriminating between truthful and deceptive responses. Signal
detection parameters based on a comparison with the simulated
innocent group showed accurate discrimination for all conditions,
but did not reveal the same advantage of the dual-task conditions
over the traditional RT-based CIT. This apparent inconsistency
is not simply a byproduct of the overall slower responses found
in the dual tasks, as revealed by our analyses on standardized
data. The most plausible explanation is that some participants
in the CITShift condition might have presented extremely large
probe-irrelevant differences, which were responsible for the group
effect. In the light of the current research, the comparison of dif-
ferences in response latency at a group level need to be interpreted
with caution. Combining analyses performed on raw and trans-
formed data can provide important information regarding the
most appropriate interpretation of differences in response latency.
The computed hit rates for all conditions were slightly higher than
those previously found in other RT-based CIT studies (e.g., hit rate
of 56%, Verschuere et al., 2009). However, the hit rates computed
in our study were still modest (as compared to 95% discrimina-
tion accuracy found by Seymour et al., 2000, although different
estimating methods were used in that study). Looking at combi-
nations between CIT versions, a combined measure including both
CIT and CITShift showed the highest discrimination efficiency. In
terms of accuracy, the demand to flexibly shift between types of
responses generated the largest discrepancy between probes and
irrelevants, while the additional memory load led to ceiling levels
of performance accuracy on the CIT (98% for both probes and
irrelevants). Performance accuracy on the concurrent tasks was
affected by the type of trial (truthful or deceptive), revealing that
these tasks could themselves provide valuable clues for deception
detection.
The study extends the existing literature dealing with the impact
of interfering tasks on the CIT (Ambach et al., 2008, 2011; Hu
et al., 2013) in several ways. In the Ambach and collaborators’
studies the exposure time for each CIT (pictorial) stimulus was
very large (10 s) in order to collect physiological measures. The
authors themselves state that the longer mean RT to CIT stimuli
than in other studies could be responsible for the surprising results
of shorter RTs for probes than for irrelevants, possibly suggest-
ing strategic alterations of responses in order to appear innocent.
In our study the use of the RT-based CIT, the faster pace of the
task (1.2 s per verbal stimulus) led to a greater temporal overlap
between the primary and the concurrent task, probably gener-
ating a stronger interference. However, the self-paced nature of
the task induces a potential confound: individual response speed
influences overall task speed because by responding earlier the
subject receives the following item earlier. A basic measure of psy-
chomotor speed could be introduced to investigate the impact of
this individual difference. A further potential confound might be
introduced by using three ISIs. However, an analysis of RTs to each
stimulus type separated by the preceding ISI interval (500, 800, or
1100 ms) revealed no significant differences.
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Second, in both Ambach et al.’s (2008, 2011), and the Hu
et al. (2013) studies the inhibition task was peripheral and did
not involve the CIT stimuli themselves. In the present study, the
concurrent task involved processing the CIT stimuli themselves
(remembering the second word of each item in the CITMem and
shifting between CIT stimuli written in bold or italics in the CIT-
Shift). Again, this might have increased the interference between
the two tasks, and led to differences in accuracy/RT between con-
ditions. Finally, Ambach et al. (2011) consider the assignment
of conditions (with or without parallel tasks) to large blocks as
a potential limitation of their initial study. They favored rapid
switches between conditions in the second study. However, we
believe that in our design, this manipulation would have induced
additional trial-by-trial switching costs, which would obscure the
specific effect of memory load/shifting interference. Thus, a large
blocks counterbalanced design was chosen.
In the present study, the detection efficiency (compared to a
simulated innocent group) in the conditions in which interfering
memory (AUC= 0.83) or shifting (AUC= 0.88) demands were
introduced was not significantly larger than in the pure RT-based
CIT (AUC= 0.86). This final value is strikingly similar to the
one obtained by Hu et al. (2013) for their pure RT-based CIT in
the comparison with an authentic innocent group (AUC= 0.86).
However, in their case, the introduction of an interfering inhibi-
tion task led to a significant improvement in detection efficiency
(AUC= 0.94). One possibility is that inhibition plays a more cru-
cial role in the deception processes required by the CIT than mem-
ory updating or switching, so that interfering with these inhibitory
processes leads to greater disruption of deceptive responses. How-
ever, design differences between ours and the Hu et al. (2013)
study (e.g., a substantially larger number of trials in our case, the
use of a peripheral rather than central interference task in their
case, and the use of a simulated versus a real innocent group)
makes it problematic to directly contrast the findings of these two
studies. Further research is needed to disentangle the differen-
tial contributions of inhibition, switching, and memory updating
demands to the production and execution of deceptive responses
in the CIT, preferably in a unitary interference design such as the
one proposed in the present study.
An important limitation of the present study is the fact that the
exposure time for each stimulus exceeded 1 s,allowing for potential
strategic alterations of response speed (Seymour et al., 2000). This
could account for the relatively smaller difference between RTs
for irrelevants (50–100 ms) and for probes than those obtained in
other studies, in which the difference was approximately 200 ms
(Seymour et al., 2000; Seymour and Kerlin, 2008, but see Ver-
schuere et al., 2010, for similar difference values to ours). Other
limits include the uneven distribution of the sample by gender,
which can affect the generalization of the data from the present
investigation.
In accordance with the conclusions made by Meijer et al. (2007),
our results also indicate that it is worthwhile to combine several
different types of lie detection measures. Future studies should
make a direct comparison between the incremental validity of RT-
based CIT and an RT-based CIT plus a CITShift. The inclusion
of an authentic, rather than a simulated innocent group is also
recommended.
Both the RT-based CIT, and the “cognitive load” paradigms
are recent developments in deception detection research. They are
supported by a growing body of evidence (so far, mostly labo-
ratory) that can inform research into the cognitive mechanisms
involved in the deceptive act. The use of an interference design
can deepen this understanding, creating a selective disruption
of a particular executive skill involved in deception. Theoreti-
cally, by experimentally introducing different concurrent tasks,
one can speculate with regards to the extent to which a particu-
lar executive skill is essential to the deceptive act when disrupted,
and thus inform research into the neurocognitive mechanisms
involved in deception. An implicit assumption which guides the
interpretation of our results is that there is a general mechanism
subserving both executive functioning and deceptive responses
(Johnson et al., 2004), so that disrupting the efficiency of executive
functions would directly impact the way a person constructs and
executes the deceptive response. However, there is an open ques-
tion regarding the possibility to dissociate the executive processes
underlying deceptive behavior based on such interference designs.
Considering the differences between the two dual-task exper-
imental conditions (different fonts used only in the CITShift,
regular breaks provided only by the CITMem), their differen-
tial impact on deception detection cannot be directly contrasted.
Alternative interference designs which would equate for all these
experimental variables and would also separately test for individ-
ual proficiency in distinct executive functions could offer valu-
able insights into the executive mechanisms underlying deceptive
behavior.
Could the RT-based CIT plus a concurrent task be potentially
implemented in field settings? Our results caution us not to trans-
fer this procedure without further documenting its impact upon
both RT and accuracy of responses. In the case of CITMem, while
the RT for correct responses (the main output) supports the poten-
tial of such interference designs to enhance deception detection,
an analysis of response accuracy reveals that there are also more
correct responses, which makes their comparison with the CIT
questionable in terms of RT. As suggested previously, it is possible
that this effect might be a result of the CITMem targeting the very
contents of the CIT, leading to an increased/prolonged processing
of these contents, and to a better performance in deceptively deny-
ing their recognition. Further research should confirm whether
the introduction of a CITMem peripheral to the CIT in the rapid-
paced version of the CIT might provide an optimal candidate for
detecting deception.
The demand to flexibly shift between two types of motor
responses in accordance to a perceptual characteristic of the
CIT stimuli was found to discriminate best between truthful
and deceptive responses (at least at a group level). This result
has potential implications for interviewing techniques, espe-
cially for those involving visual stimuli. Interviewers can alter-
nate between relevant and irrelevant questions regarding criti-
cal stimuli from an investigation. It has been shown that rapid
alternations between question types (e.g., relevant and irrel-
evant/unanticipated questions), differentially affects liars’, and
truth-tellers’ responses (Vrij et al., 2009). However, a cautionary
note relates to the possibility of using the CITShift as a counter-
measure. More specific, deceptive subjects might deliberately focus
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on the perceptual characteristics of the stimulus and ignore their
contents, undermining the deception detection process. An impor-
tant detail is to use a strict response timing deadline that would
not permit the participants to strategically alter their responses
(as stressed by Seymour et al., 2000). In addition, the fact that the
participant would focus only on the secondary task as a counter-
measure and ignore the CIT task (leading to higher error rates)
would be reflected in an increased accuracy on this concurrent
task and facilitate the detection of deliberate faking.
Finally, our results suggest that in any potential application of
the RT-based CIT, participants’ responses should be videotaped
and analyzed in terms of response accuracy, consistency, and
speed, because the outputs from multiple deception indexes do
not necessarily converge.
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APPENDIX
Table A1 | Items (English translation) derived from the mock crime and used in the RT-based CIT.
Probes Targets Irrelevants
Psiho MCC* Psiho GEN Psiho DEZ Psiho COG Psiho JUD Psiho SOC
Four green Nine brown Six yellow Five orange One red Seven black
Amalia Ciuca Bianca Coman Emilia Anton Marcela Petre Lavinia Dinu Simona Matei
Café Amber Café Dante Café Tonka Café Zebra Café Antic Café Bistro
Bicaz Street Tomis Street Tusnad Street Arges Street Bacau Street Galati Street
*The abbreviation Psiho XXX stands for the name of the course in Romanian, for example: Psiho GEN, general psychology; MCC, cognitive behavioral modifications;
DEZ, developmental psychology; COG, cognitive psychology; JUD, forensic psychology; SOC, social psychology; the students are used with these abbreviations for
their courses names.
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